more subtle than others that simply rebuild a building or a neighbourhood destroyed by war, brick by brick. (To recreate a physical place without new representations of peoples' traumatic experiences of it may simply constitute denial.) The projects in Little Tokyo reweave the past and the present, the social and the spatial. They address the possibilities of healing, as personal memories of loss are braided in new public activities of remembrance, redress, and resistance.

Acknowledgements
The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation has sponsored two conferences discussing 'War, victimhood, resistance, and remembrance.' I would like to thank the foundation, and the conference leaders, Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, for suggesting that I write this paper, and Gail Dubrow, Peter Marris, Sibyl Harwood, Karen Ishizuka, and Diane Okawahira for their advice.

8 The Algerian War in French collective memory

Antoine Prost

From November 1954 to March 1962 French troops fought in Algeria, in order to keep Algeria a part of France. This was a conflict which, in France, was not officially termed a war at all. The end result was the independence of Algeria under the control of the FLN (National Liberation Front), and the departure for France of 1 million French people who thought life would be impossible in Algeria under the new regime.

This war was arguably the longest war of decolonization, and although French forces undoubtedly were better equipped and more numerous than the Algerian fellaghas, it still cost 35,000 French soldiers their lives. However, it has disappeared from collective memory. No agency of remembrance did work to commemorate the memories of this war. Jean-Pierre Rioux pointed out this fact effectively in a paper published in 1990: 'Since 1962,' he wrote, 'there is no French national memory of the Algerian conflict; this un-named war never received the honours of memory.' This chapter deals with the reasons why in France there is no public memory of the Algerian War.

The Algerian War

Algeria was an integral part of France. During the Second World War, de Gaulle's provisional government moved from London to Algiers, where it was on French territory. It was divided into three départements and had roughly the same administration as others in metropolitan France. When needed, bureaucrats and teachers were appointed to Algerian selection boards and schools as well as to metropolitan ones by committees in the central administration. Many civil servants began their career there and later went back to France.

The Algerian War in French collective memory

During the early 1950s, approximately one out of a million people living in Algeria were French citizens, among them lawyers, doctors, teachers, and other professionals. They resided in the indigenous areas, as did many of the people who were living there. The French government, through the "Pieds noirs" policy, was committed to sending police forces to Algeria and to maintaining order. However, nationalist rebellion expanded, and it was necessary to send conscripts from France to Algeria. These conscripts were not as strongly committed to the cause of French Algeria as the Algerian partisans were to maintaining their own control. Active officers were convinced that the FLN did not have a chance against the French army. Hence, the military conflict against the FLN did not open the way to a political solution. French public opinion was reluctant to support fully the military conflict against the FLN, and the policy of self-determination (September 1959) was not able to negotiate with the FLN, which led to the Evian treaty (18 March 1962), and the recognition of an independent Algerian republic.

To French public opinion, the Algerian War was a much more important matter than the Vietnam War, which ended with the Geneva agreement of 1954. First, Vietnam was quite far from France, and French public opinion was not as strongly committed to the cause of French Algeria as the Algerian partisans were to maintaining their own control. Second, the Algerian War was a confused manner, French people and the Algerian 'rebels' who were fighting for an independent Algeria were very similar in their social background. However, French public opinion was reluctant to support fighting for an independent Algeria. Hence, the military conflict against the FLN did not open the way to a political solution. French public opinion was reluctant to support fully the military conflict against the FLN, and the policy of self-determination (September 1959) was not able to negotiate with the FLN, which led to the Evian treaty (18 March 1962), and the recognition of an independent Algerian republic.

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There was a second reason why French opinion, although indecisive, was concerned with the Algerian conflict much more than with the Vietnamese one. The Vietnam War had been fought by an expeditionary force, including many troops from the French Empire, and Moroccan and Algerian Muslim soldiers; only volunteers had gone from metropolitan France to the Vietnamese battlefields. General Giap's army was actually an army, with guns and heavy weapons; against it, the French army had fought a war similar to ordinary wars, with battles such as that of Dien Bien Phu, with winners and losers. On the contrary, the Algerian War was fought by conscripts from France against small groups of rebels, and not against an army. The FLN fellaghas never became an army, with heavy weapons and large battalions. The 'un-named' war was termed an 'operation to maintain public order'. It consisted of a succession of small-scale fights with dozens of rebels, not battles in the full meaning of the word. Rather than a war, it was a series of guerrilla clashes.

Actually, in Algeria the crucial issue was to keep a tight control of the Muslim civil population, an objective which made it necessary to have French troops in almost every village. For this quadrillage, a huge number of soldiers was needed. The French government sent to Algeria the whole of the conscript army, month after month, and for the entire span of their military service, which was lengthened from eighteen to twenty-four, and later to twenty-seven, months.

During the six years which the war lasted, there were permanently nearly 500,000 soldiers from France in Algeria. In total, almost 3 million young Frenchmen crossed the Mediterranean Sea to campaign in the Algerian djebels, far from their family and their loved ones. They belonged to all sections of French society: they were white-collar workers, workers, peasants, students; they had postponed their personal projects, left their jobs, their young brides, or their fiancées, sometimes newborn children. They suffered losses, injuries, separation from their families, and so on. Inevitably millions of French people worried about their fate.

This is the context in which to place France's very strong concern for the Algerian War. Many highly emotional issues were intermingled: considerations of national prestige, solidarity with the Pieds noirs, worry for sons, husbands, and friends fighting in Algerian djebels. These reasons made it difficult to envisage either an independent Algeria or a never-ending war.

It seemed to French public opinion that only a few activists were involved in the rebellion on the fellaghas' side, and it was inconceivable that a powerful army would be unable to win a war against so weak an enemy. But it was clear too that it was impossible to maintain the privilege of the Pieds noirs. Time was needed for the idea to surface that there was no alternative to entering into discussions with the FLN, leading to an independent Algeria. Potentially, ex-soldiers and Pieds noirs had the possibility to present themselves as victims of the Algerian War. We will discuss later the reasons why they did not fulfil this prospect.

Let us begin briefly with a third group of potential victims, of whom we have not spoken: the harkis. The harkis were soldiers from the native Muslim community of Algeria, enrolled as complementary forces to supplement the French army. They did not form regular units enrolled in the French army; they rather formed a kind of civil militia with light weapons for night patrols around the villages. The harkis helped the French army to flood the countryside, in the tactic they called quadrillage.

At the end of the war, the harkis were in a critical position. They were volunteers, committed to the French and the perpetuation of colonial domination. They were deemed traitors by the FLN, and it was clear that many of them would be murdered after independence. Actually, between 55,000 and 75,000 of them were killed.

Notwithstanding contrary orders, some officers thought it was impossible to abandon them when they left Algeria, and approximately 85,000 of them came to France. Unfortunately, it was difficult to integrate them into French society. They had no family in France, no relations; most of them were unskilled, and only some of them were educated, French-speaking people. When in France, they were put in camps. Progressively, their conditions of living and housing became better, their children went to French primary schools, they found casual employment.

But the difference between them and Algerian immigrants was not evident, and in France they encountered the same difficulties as immigrants in renting a flat or finding a job. They were perceived as a burden to the army and to French society as a whole. They did not even form a sub-sections of veterans' associations. They remained second-class Frenchmen. They did not count in the public debate until recent years, when mass unemployment precipitated nationalist, racist, or xenophobic movements. Then, the sons and daughters of the harkis, more educated than their parents, no longer saw being unemployed and socially excluded as acceptable, suffering at one and the same time for their fathers' commitment to France and their own Algerian origin.

Some of them joined in violent demonstrations in several small towns of southern France. They won some improvements, but they were insufficiently numerous to create more than local difficulties.

Much more puzzling is the case of the other two groups: neither the Pieds noirs nor the ex-soldiers found ways to commemorate collectively their experience and their losses. They never formed a community of victims. Why?

**The Pieds noirs: a restricted memory**

The first reason was the division of these two groups. Had they united their forces, they could have been more successful. But the fact is that they were divided. The relationship between the ex-soldiers and the Pieds noirs had been ambiguous during the war. A recent study in oral history among ex-non-commissioned officers shows the resentment of these young Frenchmen from France against the Pieds noirs. Although they came to fight the Algerian rebellion and protect the Pieds noirs at great personal risk, they were not given a very warm welcome by the Pieds noirs. They felt that the Pieds noirs thought it was natural that French soldiers would protect them, and that the locals did not value highly enough the sacrifices they had made.

Small anecdotes still vivid in these ex-officers’ memories illustrate their sense of frustration and deception. One of them says they were never invited to dance with the daughters of the Pieds noirs. Another remembers that once a Pied noir settler asked him to pay for a glass of water. A poll among 533 soldiers coming back to France in 1959 presented similar evidence. Such little incidents, and their significance, help account for the fact that in his 1959 poll 61 per cent of the respondents expressed more antipathy to French soldiers, are revealing. They help account for the fact that in this 1959 poll 61 per cent of the respondents expressed more antipathy against the Pieds noirs than against the ‘Arabs’.

On the other hand, the Pieds noirs resented the distinction made by many non-commissioned officers and conscript soldiers from the other side of the Mediterranean Sea between the interests of France as a nation-state and the interests of the Pieds noirs. They found that at times the French army did not share their point of view. This friction turned into open opposition when renegade French army officers formed a clandestine organization, the OAS (Secret Army Organization), dedicated to keeping Algeria French. The OAS directly confronted the army, and so did the Pieds noirs. French soldiers opened fire on Pieds noirs demonstrating against the French government; several demonstrators were killed. The fusillade on the rue d’Isly in Algiers on 26 March 1962 was the climax of this kind of internal war. In the light of such events, one can understand why it was very difficult for ex-soldiers and Pieds noirs to constitute any kind of community after the war, let alone act as a ‘fictive kinship group’.

The one million Pieds noirs living in Algeria were full French citizens. After independence, most of them had the right to live in Algeria, with joint Algerian and French nationalities. However, there was a clear and overwhelming consensus within Algerian public opinion and among officials that their only choice was between leaving or being killed. They chose to go – for some to return – to France, abandoning in Algeria everything they could not take with them. They lost their land and property, their houses, their furniture, and sometimes their savings. As they were numerous and had suffered heavy material losses, they had grounds to claim reparations from the French state.

After a few months in France, the Pieds noirs formed specific associations of rapatriés (people returning to their homeland) in order to express their demands for compensation from the state. The main association, with perhaps 200,000 members in the late 1980s, is the ANFANOMA (National association of Frenchmen from North Africa, from overseas and of their friends). This organization had been founded in 1956 after Tunisia and Morocco had declared independence. After 1962, it was there for the Pieds noirs. Many other associations were formed in later years: RECOURS (Rallying point and unitary coordination of rapatriés); and FURR (Federation for the unity of rapatriés, refugees and their friends), among others.

These associations operated as pressure groups urging Parliament and the government to pass laws to compensate rapatriés for all that they had lost. But, as such indemnification would have been costly, the government was very reluctant to do so. The law of indemnification was passed only in 1970, after the events of May 1968. Payments were spaced over a long period after claimants submitted documentation often

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7 930,000 Pieds noirs came to France from Algiers in 1962. See Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, p. 256.
difficult to obtain. This unsatisfactory and deceptive law was modified in 1974 and further improved in 1987, but many Pâtres noirs still believe that they have never been compensated for the losses they suffered.

The Pâtres noirs movement was and still is weakened by political rivalries. Many associations opposed the Gaullists in the presidential or legislative elections, since de Gaulle remains in their opinion the man who abandoned and betrayed them. RECOURS alone supported Jacques Chirac. The resentment against the Gaullists, responsible for the Algerian disaster, opened the way for more... By and large, as the Pâtres noirs were not united politically, the associations they founded are politically diverse.

However, claiming benefits is only one of the functions of these associations; they have cultural and emotional aims too. Besides the major or associations, there are smaller ones grounded on local affinities, or of origin, or of destination – the city of Jemmapes, for instance. Other associations have their own objectives, keeping alive songs, folklore, and theatre. These are a memory of lost Algeria, still alive in these small local groups, as it is alive in the very large families where cousins, aunts, uncles, and their kin meet together regularly for baptisms, weddings, funerals, or sometimes on birthdays or feasts. Their cultural difference remains, but it does not operate as a framework for a kind of outward political or social movement. Their restricted memory is for internal use only.

On that point, two qualifications must be made. One could ask whether hostility to immigrants in contemporary France is fed by the Pâtres noirs’ trauma. Possibly, some Pâtres noirs think that since they had been forced to quit their beloved country and their familiar environment thirty-five years ago, now they want to keep this country as their own. One can understand their propensity to take an active part in the nationalist movements such as the Front national of Jean-Marie Le Pen.

A second qualification concerns Jewish Pâtres noirs. Was not the new strong Jewish identity of French Sephardi Jews, whose fathers were not threatened by the Nazi genocide, a kind of substitute for an alternative memory? For a kind of outward political or social movement. Their restricted memory is for internal use only.

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The Algerian War in French collective memory

The ex-soldiers: an impossible memory

The second group of potential victims of the Algerian War were the conscripts. Like the Pieds noirs, although for different reasons, they too were unable to convert personal memories of that war into a collective memory. First, they were deeply divided politically. Their veterans' association, the FNACA (National Federation of Anciens Combattants of Algeria), was controlled by the French Communist Party. This made it impossible for more conservative veterans to enroll in that association. Second, there were sub-sections for Algerian veterans. These two associations, the FANCA (National Federation of Anciens Combattants of Algeria), was controlled by the French Communist Party. This made it impossible for more conservative veterans to enroll in that association. A particular sub-section was created in 1961 for people of this forgotten generation who participated in the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jews, but not by an amnesty; hence they have not been discussed in the courts. It is dificult to conclude this discussion, one unknown soldier of the Algerian War, or later in October 1961 when he was responsible as the Prefect of the Gironde prefecture in the deportation of Jew
historical situations. But there are similarities too. French soldiers fighting the fellaghas: were they entirely different from German soldiers fighting the résistants? Were their methods so different? The debate over torture posed the question anyway: was the villa Susini different from the Gestapo’s cellars? It was impossible to avoid the parallel; even if confronted openly, such a debate would have been devastating.

However, French soldiers in Algeria still had the question in mind. Some of the ex-officers interviewed by B. Kaplan say it openly: ‘We were doing quadrillage as the Germans did. Others [the fellaghas] were fighting guerrillas as the maquis were. We knew that very well; we had seen the maquis, we had seen the Germans. It was memories of our childhood. And we were the Germans, with our heavy weapons. They, they were the maquis, and we were the German occupation troops.’ For these soldiers, the Algerian War was and remained a dirty war; the indisputable legitimacy of the Resistance against the Nazis undermined the legitimacy of the Algerian War.

Hence, as B. Stora has suggested, the soldier’s memory of the war remained a merely private memory. ‘Soldiers without victory, without good causes, and without enthusiasm cannot become positive figures.’ Many books were published about the war – more than one thousand reflecting every angle of opinion. However, most of them were only narratives of individual experience, given and read as such. There was no collective work of remembrance, and the memory of the Algerian War was submerged by that of other events. This unnamed war was a necessary memory. The principle of legitimacy is fully alive here: it remains a merely private memory. ‘Soldiers without victory, without good causes, and without enthusiasm cannot become positive figures.’

The Second World War: resistance and national unity

This is precisely what makes the memory of the Second World War a necessary memory. The principle of legitimacy is fully alive here: it works to support and deepen the memory of this war. However, such principles tend to bend memories in some respects.

The victims were many. Prisoners of war, for instance, numbered 1,800,000 in 1940. No doubt they were victims of the war, but not entirely legitimate ones. They had not fought enough. According to the military system of values which was shared by the older cohorts among the French population, mainly by First World War veterans, surrendering was shameful. The POWs were not welcomed by the existing associations of anciens combattants de ’14, which contested their status as combatants. Was not surrendering the opposite of fighting? Hence the POWs were obliged to create their own association in order to claim benefits. They meaningfully entitled it the ‘Federation of combatant prisoners’. It is now the largest association of veterans (300,000 members) and it succeeded in making the prisoners legitimate victims of the war. But when it achieved this goal, it was too late: the individual prisoners had succeeded too in achieving their own goals – to recover their civilian condition, their occupation, and their family life.

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12 Kaplan, ‘Une generation d’élèves’, pp. 176 ff. Many years later, Claude Bourdet who had been one of the leaders of the résistance movement ‘Combat’ and an ex-deportee to Buchenwald, stated the point: ‘I saw what the Nazis did. Was it worth it to defeat the Nazis by doing the same things as they did?’ Cited in Stora, La garde et l’oubli, p. 110.


The Algerian War in French collective memory

was an outcry in that part of France, when it became clear that the Gendarmes were guilty and would be sentenced. The government sentenced the perpetrators and found a compromise; they were condemned to life imprisonment and eventually released. The government's attitude towards collaboration and complicity would be remembered. As noted above, the legitimacy of the resistance was challenged, which reinforced the idea that the war was fought by the French against themselves.

This paradox is still alive. Paul Touvier was sentenced in 1944 for having sent to death seven Jews in 1944. According to French law, it is impossible to try someone fifty years after the deed. However, in this case, the claim was that the Gestapo had nothing to do with these seven murders, which were the sole responsibility of Touvier himself. A just sentence is found on an unjust argument.

The emphasis put, after the world war, on fighting the Nazis as the only correct way to fight the war, is perfectly evident in the proceedings. The work of remembrance was made of lies, pious lies, for the sake of the French people: the evil was outside. That made it impossible to face the fact that this war was made of lies, pious, well-meaning lies. Conceived on these premises, the Epuration had the function of forgetting the French who had been accomplices. It is true that the gestapo had nothing to do with these seven murders, but they were committed by Touvier himself. A just sentence is found on an unjust argument.

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The emphasis put, after the world war, on fighting the Nazis as the only correct way to fight the war, is perfectly evident in the proceedings. The work of remembrance was made of lies, pious lies, for the sake of the French people: the evil was outside. That made it impossible to face the fact that this war was made of lies, pious, well-meaning lies. Conceived on these premises, the Epuration had the function of forgetting the French who had been accomplices. It is true that the gestapo had nothing to do with these seven murders, but they were committed by Touvier himself. A just sentence is found on an unjust argument.

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twenty-five following years, but they were not read. As Annette Wieviorka put it, Buchenwald hid Auschwitz.

Things changed one generation later, around 1968 to 1970. There were many reasons for this change: the Middle Eastern wars and the Eichmann trial; the coming to the fore of the generation of deportees’ children, such as Serge Klarsfeld; a new intellectual mood, inspired by 1968–1970 and the Foucauldian spirit of demystification. Undoubtedly, some agencies of remembrance were at work, as Annette Wieviorka’s essay in this volume attests. The results are clear: the issue of genocide has become the crucial one for the memory of the Second World War. The specifically French question of collaboration with the enemy has been replaced by that of co-operation in genocide.

Thus there has emerged progressively, forty years after the war, a community of victims of genocide. This community was constructed less by the victims themselves, survivors of the camps, but by their families and sometimes by people whose family had not been threatened by the Nazi genocide.

And here we have to cope again with the Pieds noirs: the Sephardi Jews from Algeria contrast their condition to that of the victims of genocide. The Ashkenazi Jews deported from France to the death camps have a legitimacy as war victims which the Algerian Jews never had as victims of the Algerian War. Here is another link between the very weak collective remembrance of the Algerian War and the much stronger remembrance in France of the Second World War. One could not win on every table: the memories of the résistance occluded, indeed precluded, remembrance of the Algerian War. The memories of the good, noble war, hid the memories of the dirty one, which remains un-named.

Here we see how the social framing of individual memories is a decisive element. Individuals can form groups with the aim of transforming their collective memories into social action only when these memories are compatible with social norms and values accepted by the larger community. On the contrary, it is as implausible for ex-soldiers as it is for the Pieds noirs to claim their rights as victims of war. The war itself lacked the legitimacy necessary for this claim.

Victims are victims only when being in no sense guilty of complicity in their suffering. Suffering and losses are necessary but not sufficient conditions for victimhood. Innocence is needed too.

9 Private pain and public remembrance in Israel

Emmanuel Sivan

Even my loves are measured by wars:
I am saying this happened after the Second
World War. I’ll never say
before the peace ’45–’48 or during
the peace ’56–’6107.

Yehuda Amichai

A budding Israeli novelist, Amos Oz, in the introduction to a 1968 booklet commemorating his cousin, fallen in the Six Day War, describes a meeting of friends and relatives during the ritual week of mourning:

Words. Commonplace words and unforgettable words. Tearful words. And also unspoken words . . . and between the words silences. It is impossible, ineffable. We cannot explain. There were things, moments, deeds; yet we’re unable to name them. There once was a boy in Jerusalem, we loved him, we still love him, we cannot let go of him. How little we can say about him. We remember moments, laughs, conversations. Beloved smithereens of never-to-return days.

They talk in confusion. Cutting into each other’s words, repeating themselves. Dazed by the dazzling sword of death . . . Here, now, what can we say. Now there will be a commemorative booklet.

Oz takes us into an intimate, typically Israeli scene, a sort of vigil; a wake in which comrades-in-arms, friends, and family gather and recollect, tell stories, sing songs of praise and lamentation, one after another. Together they conspire somehow to keep the beloved man around a little longer, fixing him vividly in language, before memory fades. Oz depicts an act of remembrance, part of a process of coping with death, interlaced with a rehearsal of memory traces. Unlike wakes in other